![]() Arguments that draw on six different ontological contrasts are examined: concrete versus abstract entities mind-independent versus mind-dependent entities sparse versus merely abundant properties objective versus projected entities natural versus non-natural entities and ontological pluralism. This paper investigates whether pluralism is well-motivated on ontological grounds: that is, on the basis that different discourses are concerned with (. Despite pluralism attracting increasing amounts of attention, the motivations for the view remain underdeveloped. Truth pluralists say that the nature of truth varies between domains of discourse: while ordinary descriptive claims or those of the hard sciences might be true in virtue of corresponding to reality, those concerning ethics, mathematics, institutions might be true in some non-representational or “anti-realist” sense. Critical to the response is the appeal to indeterminacy in cases of fundamental normative disagreement between reasonable normative outlooks. ![]() ![]() I then defend the proposal from the charge that it leaves insufficient room for my own fallibility, and in particular from Egan’s (2007) argument that it implies a “smug” asymmetry between myself and others. ) terms of the possibility that my judgements might be unstable through improvement, my account is designed in the first instance to vindicate the expressivist’s conception of the nature of normative inquiry. Inspired by Blackburn’s (1998: 318) proposal that I make sense of my fallibility in (. If, as expressivists maintain, the function of normative thought and talk is not to represent or describe the world, then how can normative judgements be correct or incorrect? In particular, how can I make sense of my own normative fallibility, the possibility that my own normative judgements might be mistaken? In this paper, I construct and defend a substantive but non-representational theory of normative (in)correctness for expressivists. WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, Philosophy of logic, Harvard, 1970/1986. JOHN CORCORAN, Review of sixth printing of Quine’s 1970 Philosophy of Logic. JOHN CORCORAN, Review of Quine’s 1970 Philosophy of Logic. This lecture presents and analyses two-method errors in the logic literature. But Quine never explicitly acknowledged, described, or even mentioned the error. The logical TME in, which eluded Quine’s colleagues, was corrected in the 1978 sixth printing. Quine’s discussions in the 1970 first printing of Philosophy of logic and in previous lectures were vitiated by mixing two. There are several standard ways of defining truth using sequences. But a pragmatic TME occurs in trying to deny that Abe knows Ben by using ‘It isn’t that Abe doesn’t know Ben’. One can deny that Abe knows Ben by prefixing ‘It isn’t that’ or by interpolating ‘doesn’t’. But syntactical TMEs are in ‘Abe knows what Ben looks’ and in ‘Abe knows how Ben looks like’. One can say “Abe knows how Ben looks” using ‘Abe knows what Ben looks like’. But a stylistic TME occurs in ‘Abe knows whether or not Ben draws or not’. ![]() ) ways: ‘Abe knows whether or not Ben draws’ or ‘Abe knows whether Ben draws or not’. One can say “Abe knows whether Ben draws” in two other (. This lecture analyzes examples found in technical and in non-technical contexts. Philosophy, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260-4150, USA E-mail: Philosophy, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO 80523-1781 USA E-mail: Where two methods produce similar results, mixing the two sometimes creates errors we call two-method errors, TMEs: in style, syntax, semantics, pragmatics, implicature, logic, or action. ►JOHN CORCORAN AND IDRIS SAMAWI HAMID, Two-method errors: having it both ways.
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